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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

I. INTELLIGENCE

A. A very old profession. Joshua sent spies into Jericho; Moses sent agents into the land of Canaan. Even earlier--aerial reconnaissance and meteorological mission flown by a dove Noah launched from the Ark.

B. World War II

1. Pearl Harbor.

2. Report in July 1946 of Joint Congressional Committee on the Pearl Harbor attack.

3. Comments restricted to military intelligence--recommended "That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent. . . ."

4. Intelligence versus Information.

IDA (Dr. Belden) analysis of Pearl Harbor--information abundant but intelligence poor due to breakdown in human communication; only one mechanical breakdown.

II. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

A. Established by President Truman's letter of 22 January 1946.

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B. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope:

"A PRESIDENT HAS TO KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON ALL AROUND THE WORLD IN ORDER TO BE READY TO ACT WHEN ACTION IS NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT MUST HAVE ALL THE FACTS THAT MAY AFFECT THE FOREIGN POLICY OR THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. . . .

"BEFORE 1946 SUCH INFORMATION AS THE PRESIDENT NEEDED WAS BEING COLLECTED IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PLACES IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE WAR DEPARTMENT HAD AN INTELLIGENCE DIVISION--G-2--AND THE NAVY HAD AN INTELLIGENCE SETUP OF ITS OWN--THE ONI. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ON THE ONE HAND, GOT ITS INFORMATION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, WHILE THE TREASURY AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE AND AGRICULTURE EACH HAD CHANNELS FOR GATHERING INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD--ON MONETARY, ECONOMIC, AND AGRICULTURAL MATTERS.

"DURING WORLD WAR II THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION HAD SOME OPERATIONS ABROAD, AND IN ADDITION THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, WHICH WAS SET UP BY

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PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DURING THE WAR AND PLACED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, OPERATED ABROAD TO GATHER INFORMATION.

"THIS SCATTERED METHOD OF GETTING INFORMATION FOR THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT FIRST STRUCK ME AS BEING BADLY ORGANIZED WHEN I WAS IN THE SENATE. OUR SENATE COMMITTEES, HEARING THE WITNESSES FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, WERE OFTEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT DIFFERENT AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT CAME UP WITH DIFFERENT AND CONFLICTING FACTS ON SIMILAR SUBJECTS. IT WAS NOT AT FIRST APPARENT THAT THIS WAS DUE TO THE UNCOORDINATED METHODS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, I HAVE OFTEN THOUGHT THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN SOMETHING LIKE COORDINATION OF INFORMATION IN THE GOVERNMENT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR THE JAPANESE TO SUCCEED IN THE SNEAK ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR. IN THOSE DAYS THE MILITARY DID NOT KNOW EVERYTHING THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNEW, AND THE DIPLOMATS DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL THE ARMY AND NAVY KNEW. THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, IN FACT, HAD ONLY A VERY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT TO KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED AS TO THEIR PLANS.

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"IN OTHER WORDS, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN MUCH ATTENTION PAID TO ANY CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN OUR GOVERNMENT. APPARENTLY THE UNITED STATES SAW NO NEED FOR A REALLY COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE UNTIL WORLD WAR II PLACED AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN ON THE CONTINENTS OF EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA AND ON THE ISLANDS OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC.

"THE WAR TAUGHT US THIS LESSON--THAT WE HAD TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE IN A MANNER THAT WOULD MAKE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHERE IT WAS NEEDED AND WHEN IT WAS WANTED, IN AN INTELLIGENT AND UNDERSTANDABLE FORM. IF IT IS NOT INTELLIGENT AND UNDERSTANDABLE, IT IS USELESS."

III. TWENTY YEARS LATER

Centralization essential because:

1. Any intelligence estimate needs to consider military, political, sociological, economic, scientific, and all other types of information in one single package.
2. This is an age of specialization.
3. The information explosion.
4. Speed of communication.

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IV. CIA MISSION

(Chart -- CIA mission set forth in National Security Act of 1947)

NSCIDs (8) and DCIDs (37).

(Chart -- CIA program)

(Chart - "The CIA did it. Pass it along.")

V. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

(Chart -- The Intelligence Community)

VI. THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

(Chart -- Relationships of DCI to President and Intelligence Community)

USIB Functions

The United States Intelligence Board meets at least once a week-- sometimes more often--and concerns itself with a wide variety of matters. I think there are three in particular which pretty well define the responsibilities and functions of USIB.

First, USIB establishes--and periodically reviews--the national priorities for the guidance of the intelligence community in choosing the targets and assigning assets for our intelligence effort.

Second, the Board continuously reviews the activities of the members of the community to determine whether they are in accord with those priorities, and to make sure that we are doing everything possible to close gaps and to avoid unnecessary duplication.

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Third, the Board reviews in great detail the National Intelligence Estimates which the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the President and the National Security Council. The National Security Council has defined national intelligence as information affecting the national security "which transcends the exclusive competence of any one agency or department" of the Government. These estimates are generally drafted within CIA, but they are National Intelligence Estimates, and therefore must reflect the considered judgment of the entire intelligence community. This starts with the participation of all appropriate elements of the community at the outset, in the drafting process, and is ensured by the USIB review at the end of the line.

VII. HOW DOES THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

Let me say first of all that when it comes to decision-making, we believe and in fact we insist that the role of intelligence is one of supplying objective, substantive intelligence. It may be hard fact. It may be an intelligence appreciation--our best judgment of the situation. It may be estimative--again, our best judgment of how the situation is likely to develop.

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VIII. PRODUCTION

(Chart -- What do we produce? for whom?)

- A. National Intelligence Surveys
- B. Reports and Memoranda
- C. National Intelligence Estimates

The Board of National Estimates deserves special mention.

It is a body of very senior, very knowledgeable men of varied experience, who have no other duty than to study and seek answers to the fundamental questions of national security. The Board is composed of about a dozen such men, relieved of all administrative duties and daily chores, coming from extensive backgrounds in the military, diplomatic, legal, academic, and intelligence professions. Their sole function is to hear and consider evidence and argument from the entire intelligence community, and then to recommend to the Director and to USIB what estimate the Director shall submit to the President and his advisers on matters of critical importance to national security.

We seek a careful and thoughtful judgment which will be of the greatest possible assistance to the policy-maker, but I want to stress that we do not strive for unanimity. We could achieve apparent unanimity by overriding the dissenting minority in a vote, or by

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watering down the estimate to the common denominator -- to the narrowed area of complete agreement in the thinking of the entire intelligence community. This, however, would be a disservice to the policy-maker. All we ask is that dissents be based on honest differences of opinion on how the available facts are to be evaluated and interpreted, not on personal convictions or prejudices, hunches, or parochial interests.

a. NIEs -- 37 during 1966.

Examples: "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"

"Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program"

b. SNIEs -- 17 during 1966. (Contingency SNIEs -- 4)

Examples: "Security Conditions in the Philippines"

Contingency SNIE dated 4 February 1966 to estimate how DRV capabilities to support the insurgency in the South would be affected by increasing the scope and intensity of the bombing of North Vietnam, and how long it would take for the impact to be felt in the South.

Contingency SNIE dated 27 October 1966 to estimate foreign reactions to various U.S. courses of action affecting American forces stationed in Europe. Alternatives: Maintain U.S. ground forces in West Germany at the present level or effect a substantial reduction.

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D. Current Intelligence

1. The Watch Committee of USIB concentrates on the very highly specialized field of what we call indications intelligence, looking for the indicators which might give us early warning of hostile intentions against the United States or its allies. There is a full-time activity staffed jointly by the intelligence community--the National Indications Center--at work in the Pentagon. It keeps track of possible indicators and reports those which may be significant--or for that matter the absence of any significant indicators--to the Watch Committee. The Watch Committee has a regular weekly meeting, timed so that the conclusions will be ready for the weekly USIB meeting, but in times of crisis the Watch Committee may meet one or more times a day.

2. Operations Center.

3. Current Intelligence Bulletin and Daily Brief for the President.

IX. SUMMARY

To summarize, the intelligence community of the United States Government comprises all the intelligence components of the various departments and agencies, operating under the direction and control of the United States Intelligence Board and the Director of Central Intelligence as the principal intelligence officer of the President.

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It is our job to decide what information we need to collect, to assign specific collection responsibilities to the various elements of the community in accordance with their particular capabilities, to monitor their performance, to assemble and collate the information collected, and to bring the best brains in the country, in or out of Government, to bear on it.

We then furnish the intelligence appreciations required by the decision-makers in formulating policy and give them timely warning and expert analysis of developments bearing on the national security of the United States. We support policy--we do not formulate policy--we do not advocate policy.

X. SUPERVISION

(Chart -- Supervision of CIA activities)

A. Executive Branch

1. Special Group for Covert Action ("303" Committee)

Four members under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Other members are the Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

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2. Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)

Established in March 1966 to assist the Secretary of State in the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas. Seven members under the chairmanship of the State Department (Under Secretary Katzenbach). Other members are the Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of AID, Director of USIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

3. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

First established in 1956 as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, this body of distinguished private citizens is to conduct an objective review of the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. and periodically report its findings to the President. Paramount are their reports pertaining to the quality of the foreign intelligence provided to the policy-makers, the performance of CIA, and the functioning of the other principal U.S. intelligence elements.

4. Bureau of the Budget

Cleared personnel who handle and control Agency budget.

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B. Congressional

CIA Subcommittees

- a. Appropriations
- b. Armed Services

C. Other Congressional Relationships

- 1. Foreign Relations Committee
- 2. Joint Atomic Energy Committee
- 3. Internal Security Subcommittee
- 4. Briefings during 89th Congress:
 - a. Appropriations and Armed Services Subcommittees
 - b. 30 other Committees
 - c. Many individuals

XI. PROFESSIONALISM

A. Education

Of the Agency's 75 top officials:

Doctorate	20%
Masters	28%
Bachelors	45%

B. Agency Experience

Over 10 years	61%
Over 15 years	31%

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C. Foreign Language Capability

1. Professional employees on duty:

One foreign language 69%

Three or more foreign languages 34%

2. New professional employees:

At least one foreign language 75%

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